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SEARCH AND SEIZURE: Standing to Challenge Illegally Obtained Bank Records-UnitedStates v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
Amid growing concern over the increasing utilization of foreign
financial institutions to evade taxes and conceal other illegal activities,' Congress passed the Bank Secrecy Act.' It was aimed at organized and white collar crime, and required banks and other financial
institutions to maintain records of customers' names and the activity in their accounts. 3 Moreover, the Act gave the Secretary of the
Treasury broad discretion to determine what types of records and
other evidence are useful in criminal, tax, or regulatory investigations or proceedings and to "prescribe regulations to carry out the
purposes of this section." 4 Pursuant to this authority, the Secretary
promulgated regulations directing banks to report each deposit,
withdrawal or transfer involving domestic transactions in currency
of more than $10,000.5
In Stark v. Conally,I the Act was challenged on the ground that
it was an unconstitutional invasion of citizens' right of privacy, in
violation of the fourth amendment. The Stark Court originally
struck down7 the domestic reporting provision,' but in California
1. Hearingson H.R. 15073 Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. 18 (1970) (statement of Robert M. Morgenthau, U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York).
2. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1970) (retention of records by insured banks); 12 U.S.C. § 1730d
(1970) (retention of records of savings and loan institutions insured by the Federal Savings
and Loan Ins. Corp.); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1951-59 (1970) (retention of records by noninsured financial institutions); and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970) (reporting of domestic and foreign
currency transactions). Enacted as Act of October 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 111424.
3. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b (1970), implemented by 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.31-.37 (1976). In addition, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(d) provides:
Each insured bank shall make, to the extent that the regulations of the Secretary
of the Treasury so require(1) a microfilm or other reproduction of each check, draft, or similar instrument
drawn on it and presented to it for payment; and
(2) a record of each check, draft, or similar instrument received by it for deposit
or collection, together with an identification of the party for whose account it is to be
deposited or collected, unless the bank has already made a record of the party's identity pursuant to subsection (c) of this section.
4. Bank Secrecy Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b)(1970).
5. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22 (1976).
6. 347 F. Supp. 1242 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
7. The Stark Court noted that the Act "so far transcends the constitutional limits, as
laid down by the United States Supreme Court for this kind of legislation, as to unreasonably
invade the right of privacy protected by The Bill of Rights, particularly the Fourth Amendment .... "Id. at 1251.
8. 31 U.S.C. § 1081 (1970), which provides, in part, as follows:
Transactions involving any domestic financial institution shall be reported to the

Published by eCommons, 1978

UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 3:1

Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz,' the Supreme Court later upheld the Act's
constitutionality, at least to the extent that it did not infringe on
the rights of the financial institutions. 0 Thus, the constitutionality
of the Act has been determined, at least in a limited fashion. It must
be noted, however, that the California Bankers decision "did not
place the judicial stamp of approval upon every prosecutorial tactic
for obtaining records compiled under the requirements of the Act.""
It is the purpose of this case note to focus on the implications
of United States v. Miller,' a recent Supreme Court case which
denied a bank depositor limited standing to challenge an illegal
subpoena of his bank records. 3 This case note will first analyze the
case and then discuss its ramifications regarding future government
searches of a bank depositor's bank records.
I.

FACTS

OF THE CASE

On January 9, 1973, a fire broke out in a Kathleen, Georgia,
warehouse rented to the defendant, Mitchell Miller. While fighting
the blaze, firemen and sheriff department officials discovered a 7500
gallon capacity distillery, 175 gallons of non-tax paid whiskey, and
related paraphernalia. Although no arrests were made at the time,
five persons, including the defendant Miller, were subsequently
charged."
Secretary at such time, in such manner, and in such detail as the Secretary may
require if they involve the payment, receipt, or transfer of United States currency, or
such other monetary instruments as the Secretary may specify, in such amounts,
denominations, or both, or under such circumstances as the Secretary shall by regulation prescribe.
9. 416 U.S. 21 (1974).
10. However, the Court noted that because the depositors in the suit did not engage in
the $10,000 transactions which were affected by the Act, they lacked standing. Thus, the Act's
constitutionality has not been determined with respect to a bank depositor's rights.
11. United States v. Miller, 500 F.2d 751, 757 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S.
1010 (1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
12. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
13. Limited standing, as opposed to full standing, would enable a party to enter an
appearance for a limited purpose only. In this case, it would be for the purpose of challenging
the legal sufficiency of the subpoenas. Thus, while a bank depositor would have no standing
to challenge the use of his bank records if the existing legal process is complied with, which
is consistent with recent federal court decisions, see cases cited note 25 infra, he would have
limited standing to challenge any illegally obtained evidence sought to be admitted at his
trial. See generally, 36 LA. L. REv. 834 (1976). It is the position of this casenote that such a
procedure is useful as a means of excluding illegally obtained evidence, and to prevent an
abuse of subpoena powers by the state.
14. The charges included possessing an unregistered still, carrying on the business of a
distiller without giving bond and with intent to defraud the government of whiskey tax,
possessing 175 gallons of non-tax paid whiskey, and conspiracy to defraud the United States
of tax revenues.
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On January 23, 1973, a subpoena duces tecum, completed by
the U.S. Attorney's Office, was served on the presidents of the two
banks at which the defendant had accounts. These subpoenas required the two bank presidents to produce all records of the defendant's accounts from October 1, 1972, through January 23, 1973.
These records, which were being kept in compliance with the Bank
Secrecy Act, were supplied, but the defendant was not advised of
the subpoenas or of the fact that copies of the records had been
turned over to a federal agent.
Prior to trial, the defendant moved to supress copies of checks
and other bank records obtained by means of the subpoenas. Miller
alleged the subpoenas were defective, in that they were issued by
the U.S. Attorney's Office rather than by a court, no return had
been made to a court, and they were returnable on a date when the
grand jury was not in session. 5
The district court dismissed the motion, and the prosecution
was allowed to use the surrendered copies, several of which helped
establish at least three of the counts charged against Miller.,, The
defendant was subsequently convicted. 7
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed 8
holding that the records in question fell within the zone of privacy
protected by the fourth amendment; "that obtaining copies of
Miller's bank checks by means of a faulty subpoena duces tecum
constituted an unlawful invasion of Miller's privacy; and that any
evidence so obtained should have been suppressed."' 9 In reaching its
decision, the court of appeals concluded sub silentio that the defendant had standing to challenge the subpoenas.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION

On certiorarito the Supreme Court of the United States the
decision of the court of appeals was reversed. In an opinion delivered
by Mr. Justice Powell, the Court held that the documents were the
banks' business records and not the respondent Miller's personal
15. The' grand jury did not meet again until February 12, 1973.
16. Copies of the obtained checks were introduced at trial to establish the overt acts
alleged to have been committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, which included three financial transactions-the rental by Miller of a van-type truck, the purchase of radio equipment,
and the purchase of a quantity of sheet metal and metal pipe.
17. The trial of the defendant began on April 23, 1973, and ended in a mistrial on May
1,1973. A second trial commenced on May 7, 1973, and resulted in the defendant's conviction.
See note 14 supra. The defendant was sentenced to three years imprisonment.
18. 500 F.2d 751 (5th Cir. 1974) (affirmed in part, but Miller's conviction was reversed).
19. Id. at 756.
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papers. Powell noted that the respondent could not have asserted
either ownership or possession of the records.2 0 Moreover, because
the original checks were negotiable instruments to be used in commercial transactions, and were voluntarily conveyed to the banks
and exposed to their employees in the ordinary course of business,
the respondent had no reasonable expectation of privacy.2 ' The majority concluded that, since the respondent had no protectable
fourth amendment interest, he lacked standing to challenge the
legal sufficiency of the subpoenas. In coming to this conclusion, the
Court failed to reach the important issue of whether the subpoenas
were defective, nor did the Court give any indication of the import22
ance of this contention.
Mr. Justice Brennan dissented from the reversal because he felt
the accused had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his bank
statements and records, and that obtaining the accused's bank records without benefit of legal process constituted an illegal search
and seizure.2 3 MrL Justice Marshall, in a separate dissenting opinion, refused to follow the majority because the record-keeping requirement of the Bank Secrecy Act permits the seizure of customers'
bank records without a warrant for probable cause, and because the
2
respondent had standing to challenge the Act's constitutionality. 1
III.

A.

ANALYSIS

Access to Records Governed by Existing Legal Process

Federal courts have consistently held that bank records are not
the private papers of the depositor, and consequently the depositor
25
has been denied standing to challenge their appropriation and use.
As one writer has noted, however, cases denying standing have only
dealt with legal subpoenas and summonses. 2 This was not the case
in Miller because the subpoenas challenged there had not been issued by a court, but by the U.S. Attorney's Office. By denying
20. 425 U.S. at 440.
21. Id. at 442.
22. The Supreme Court stated that "[W]e do not limit our consideration to the situation in which there is an alleged defect in the subpoena served on the bank." Id. at 441 n.2.
The Court never addressed this issue again. It is this writer's opinion that the Court should
not have dismissed so important a question as casually as it did.
23. 425 U.S. at 448.
24. Id. at 455-56.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Continental Bank and Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45, 49 (10th
Cir. 1974); Fifth Ave. Peace Parade Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 333 (2nd Cir. 1973).
26. 36 LA. L. REv. 834 (1976). See, e.g., Galbraith v. United States, 387 F.2d 617 (10th
Cir. 1968); Cole v. Franklin National Bank, 342 F.2d 5 (2nd Cir. 1965).
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Miller standing to challenge the defective subpoenas, the Supreme
Court sanctioned the use of illegally obtained evidence.
In declaring the Bank Secrecy Act constitutional, the California
Bankers majority stated that "both the legislative history and the
regulations make specific reference to the fact that access to the
records is to be controlled by existing legal process." Thus, the
majority was concerned about legal protections for bank depositors,
and based its decision on the premise that depositors would have
"adequate legal protections from improper government access to

their records.

28

One of these protections is requiring that a subpoena be issued
by a judge, and then only upon a showing of probable cause. 29 The
purpose of the hearing before a court 30 is to insure that an individual
will not be directly confronted with the organized forces of society;
the judge acts as a buffer between the individual and the state.3 ' In
Miller, however, the subpoenas were neither issued by a court nor
returned to one. The delivery of bank records without a hearing on
the issue of probable cause violates the fourth amendment 32 and
does not constitute sufficient "legal process" within the meaning of
CaliforniaBankers.
In its decision, the Miller Court dealt a death blow to the
"existing legal process" relied upon by the CaliforniaBankers Court
when it upheld the Bank Secrecy Act's constitutionality.3 3 Over
ninety years ago the Supreme Court decided Boyd v. United
27. 416 U.S. at 52. The Report of the House Committee on Banking and Currency
states: "It should be borne in mind that records to be maintained pursuant to the regulations
of the Secretary of the Treasury will not be made automatically available for law enforcement
purposes. They can only be obtained through existing legal process." H. REP. No. 91-975, 91st
Cong., 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in [1970] 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4395.
28. 500 F.2d at 757.
29. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
30. Subpoenas may also be issued by agencies, but only by congressional authorization.
See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 7602-7609. In such a case, the judicial role changes. As the Supreme Court
noted in Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), "[tlhe requirement
of 'probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation', literally applicable in the case of a
warrant, is satisfied . . . by the court's determination that the investigation is authorized by
Congress, is for a purpose Congress can order, and that the documents sought are relevant to
the inquiry." Id. at 209. The Bank Secrecy Act, however, contains no such authorization.
31. See, e.g., United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313-18 (1972);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 481-82 (1963).
32. California Bankers Ass'n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,90 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
33. In California Bankers, Justice Powell joined the majority opinion, but he made it
clear that a significant extension of the reporting requirement would pose substantial constitutional questions, and stated that concurrence with the majority was based upon the provision of the Act as narrowed by the regulations. Id. at 78-79. In Miller, however, Justice Powell
appears to have forgotten about these constitutional questions.
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States,34 in which it was stated that "a compulsory production of a
man's private papers to establish a criminal charge against him...
is within the scope of the Fourth Amendment .

. .

. "3 Since the

Miller decision, however, it can be questioned whether the Boyd
doctrine still retains its vitality.
As the court of appeals in Miller noted, "the government may
not cavalierly circumvent Boyd's precious protection by first requiring a third party bank to copy all of its depositors' personal checks
and then, with an improper invocation of legal process, calling upon
' 36

the bank to allow inspection and reproduction of those copies.

But, the Supreme Court's decision in Miller allows the government
to do just that. By allowing unreviewed government access to personal bank records, the Court has abandoned ninety years of precedent established by Boyd. Thus, the "existing legal process" relied
upon so heavily by the California Bankers majority to protect the
bank depositor provides no protection at all.
B. A Bank Depositor's Expectation of Privacy
One of the reasons given by the Miller Court to justify its decision was that the defendant had voluntarily conveyed the records
to the banks and had thereby knowingly exposed them to the prying
eyes of bank employees. It was also pointed out that Miller could
not have asserted ownership or possession of the records. The Court
concluded that Miller did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy. The Court overlooked the possibility that a bank depositor has
at least a limited expectation of privacy,37 and in so doing denied
the defendant standing to challenge the legal sufficiency of the two
subpoenas. 8
In Katz v. United States, 3 it was held that fourth amendment
protection applies only where there is a reasonable expectation of
34. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). The Miller Court tried to distinguish Boyd on the ground that
the claimants in Boyd could assert a right to privacy in those papers based on their ownership
and possession of them. Standing, however, does not depend upon a property right. See note
59 & accompanying text infra.
35. Id. at 622.
36. 500 F.2d at 757.
37. It is not this writer's contention that the defendant had a reasonable expectation
the records would remain private, but it is contended that a bank depositor does reasonably
expect the records will be divulged only pursuant to legal process. See text accompanying
note 27 supra.
38. As noted earlier, federal courts have consistently held that a bank depositor lacks
standing to sue, but such cases have only dealt with legal subpoenas and summonses. Such
was not the case in Miller. See cases cited note 26 supra.
39. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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privacy in an area subject to governmental intrusion."0 The Katz
Court went on to say that "what . . . [a person] seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected." 4 '
It cannot be gainsaid that a depositor does not expect public
disclosure of his private financial transactions.4" Doubtless some
expectation of privacy exists in the details of one's personal financial affairs,43 even though exposures normally do occur in everyday
transactions, e.g., credit checks among lending institutions.44 Despite such knowledge that each discrete transaction is exposed to
the view of other individuals, the depositor does not expect a universal eye to oversee the totality of these exchanges." Furthermore, any
exposure by governmental intrusion is not expected to be obtained
illegally through, for example, an illegal subpoena.4"
The California Supreme Court in a recent case47 noted that a
bank depositor's "reasonable expectation is that, absent compulsion
by legal process, the matters he reveals to the bank will be utilized
by the banks only for internal banking purposes."4 In that case,
40. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 351-52.
42. See generally, 36 LA. L. REv. 834 (1976).
43. City of Carmel-by-the-Sea v. Young, 2 Cal.3d 259, 268-69, 466 P.2d 225, 231-32, 85
Cal. Rptr. 1, 7-8 (1970). In that case, the Supreme Court of California declared that a
financial interests public disclosure statute directing that every public officer and each candidate file a statement describing his investments and those owned by either his spouse or
minor child was constitutionally overbroad,,in that it intruded into the private financial
affairs of the numerous public officials and employees. The court noted that "[Tihe right
of privacy concerns one's feelings and one's own peace of mind, and certainly one's personal
financial affairs are an essential element of such peace of mind." Id. at 268, 466 P.2d at 231,
85 Cal. Rptr. at 7 (footnote omitted).
44. In CaliforniaBankers, Justice Powell noted that:
Financial transactions can reveal much about a person's activities, associations, and
beliefs. At some point, governmental intrusion upon these areas would implicate legitimate expectations of privacy. Moreover, the potential for abuse is particularly acute
where, as here, the legislative scheme permits access to this information without invocation of the judicial process. In such instances, the important responsibility for balancing societal and individual interests is left to unreviewed executive discretion,
rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate.
416 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring).
45. See generally, 51 TExAs L. REv. 602 (1972).
46. See note 42 supra.
47. Burrows v. Superior Court of San Bernardino County, 13 Cal.3d 238, 529 P.2d 590,
118 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1974). This decision was quoted with much approval by Mr. Justice
Brennan in his dissent in Miller.
48. Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169. The California Supreme Court
went on to hold that the petitioner in that case "had a reasonable expectation that the bank
would maintain the confidentiality of those papers which originated with him in check form
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representatives of several banks testified that information in their
a customer's account was considered by them
possession regarding
49
to be confidential.
It is the general rule in other jurisdictions, as well, that a bank
impliedly agrees not to divulge confidential information without the
customer's consent, unless compelled by a court order.50 It has been
assumed in those jurisdictions that the right of privacy extends to
one's confidential financial affairs as well as to the details of one's
personal life."' Other courts have thus held that a bank depositor has
an expectation of privacy and that he does have standing to challenge a subpoena of his bank records. The Miller Court should have
recognized this expectation and granted Miller limited standing.
C.

Standing

The doctrine of "standing" emanates from the "case or controversy" requirement of the Constitution" and from general principles
of judicial administration. 3 It seeks to insure that the plaintiff has
alleged "such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends . . . ."" The
Miller Court reasoned that because Miller had no reasonable expectation of privacy, he did not have a real interest in the ultimate
adjudication. But, as pointed out earlier, a bank depositor does have
at least a limited expectation of privacy.
While Miller was denied limited standing, the Supreme Court
indicated that the banks involved did have standing and could have
objected to the subpoenas. It can be questioned, however, whether
the two banks could, or would, adequately represent and protect the
and of the bank statements into which a record of those same checks had been transformed
pursuant to internal bank practice." Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
49. Id. at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
50. See First National Bank in Lenox v. Brown, 181 N.W.2d 178 (1970); Milohnich v.
First National Bank of Miami Springs, 224 So. 2d 759 (1969).
51. As the Idaho Supreme Court noted in Peterson v. Idaho First National Bank, 83
Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961), "It is inconceivable that a bank would at any time consider
itself at liberty to disclose the intimate details of its depositors' accounts. Inviolate secrecy
is one of the inherent and fundamental precepts of the relationship of the bank and its
customers or depositors." Id. at 584, 367 P.2d at 290.
52. U.S. CONST. art. III, cl. 2.
53. See, e.g., Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 255 (1953).
54. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). See also Sierra Club v. Morton, 400 F. Supp.
610, 623 (N.D. Cal. 1975); Campaign Clean Water, Inc. v. Ruckelshaus, 361 F. Supp. 689,
692 (E.D. Va. 1973).
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defendant. 55 As the court of appeals accurately stated, "[H]e whose
rights are threatened by the improper disclosure here was a bank
depositor, not a bank official, and depositors as well as banks must
be accorded the protection of 'legal process' "." If the subpoenas
were defective, as Miller contended, then this would not be valid
legal process."
Because banks have little to lose, there is no assurance that
they have the necessary personal stake to guarantee that clear and
justiciable issues will be formulated. A bank depositor, on the other
hand, does have an important personal stake, and will suffer direct
injury as a result of any governmental abuse of the legal process. As
the Supreme Court of California has noted, "[T]he protection...
[of the bank customer's right of privacy] should not be left entirely
to the election of third persons who may have their own personal
reasons for permitting or resisting disclosure of confidential information received from others."5 Accordingly, Miller should have
been granted limited standing to protect his own interests.
The Miller Court emphasized that Miller could not have asserted either ownership or possession of the records. Standing, however, does not depend upon a property right, but upon whether the
area was one in which there was a reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion. 9
As a further justification for denying standing, the Miller Court
noted that the Act was not designed to circumvent established
fourth amendment rights, but rather "[i]t is merely an attempt to
facilitate the use of a proper and longstanding law enforcement
technique[s] by insuring that records are available when they are
needed." 0 While the elimination of tax fraud and other criminal
conduct through the regulation of bank records is a proper govern55. Evidence of this fact is the banks' failure to challenge the subpoenas, or even to
notify the defendant that his bank records were being requested.
56. 500 F.2d at 758. See also Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 537 (1971)
(Douglas, J., concurring); United States v. Kordel, 397 U.S. 1, 7 (1970).
57. 500 F.2d at 757-758.
58. Valley Bank of Nevada v. Superior Court of San Joaquin County, 15 Cal.3d 652,
657, 542 P.2d 977, 979, 125 Cal. Rptr. 553, 555 (1975).
59. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). See also Mancusi v. Deforte,
392 U.S. 364, 368-69 (1968); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 267 (1960). In his dissent
in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969), Justice Fortas went even further, asserting
that "any defendant against whom illegally acquired evidence is offered, whether or not it
was obtained in violation of his right to privacy, may have the evidence excluded." Id. at 20506 (Fortas, J., dissenting). Justice Fortas felt that this is the only way to fully implement
fourth amendment protections.
60. 425 U.S. at 441.
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mental purpose,' that alone does not justify means that broadly
stifle fundamental liberties where the end can be more narrowly
achieved.62 There must be a balancing of interests between the possible assistance to the government in its investigations of citizens,
on the one hand, and the right to maintain privacy in one's personal
financial affairs, on the other. The Miller Court, however, failed to
balance these societal and individual interests. In doing so, the
responsibility for this balancing is left to unreviewed executive dis3
cretion, rather than the scrutiny of a neutral magistrate.
By allowing an illegal subpoena of a depositor's bank records
without benefit of a judicial hearing on the issue of probable cause,
the Supreme Court has left the door wide open for unreviewed access to all bank records. Moreover, if the bank depositor is denied
standing, no objection will ever be raised unless the bank has its
own reasons to challenge the subpoenas.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court's recent decision in Miller had a fatal effect
on a depositor's standing to challenge an illegal subpoena of his
bank records. In reversing the court of appeals' decision, the Court
denied the defendant the right to challenge illegally obtained evidence which was used against him at trial. This, in turn, created the
possibility of convicting a defendant on illegally obtained evidence,
which is, or was, that against which the fourth amendment was
designed to protect.
At common law, the admissibility of evidence was not affected
by the illegality of the means by which it was obtained. 4 The
61. See 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1) (1970), where it is stated that the records are to be
maintained because they "have a high degree of usefullness in criminal, tax, and regulatory
investigations and proceedings."
62. The familiar rule is that a "governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulation may not be achieved by means which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms." NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964). See also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960). One of the
ways the end could have been narrowly achieved would be to require a court-issued subpoena
before bank records could be released.
63. See note 44 supra. The Burrows court, 13 Cal.3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal. Rptr.
166 (1974), noted that:
To permit a police officer access to these [bank] records merely upon his request,
without any judicial control as to relevancy or other traditional requirements of legal
process, and to allow the evidence to be used in any subsequent criminal prosecution
against a defendant, opens the door to a vast and unlimited range of very real abuses
of police power.
Id. at 247, 529 P.2d at 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 172.
64. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
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235

Court's decision in Miller marks a return to this harsh rule, and
represents a dangerous step toward further governmental intrusion
into the privacy of its citizens. Earlier concerns have been disregarded. 5 Moreover, the Supreme Court has either rejected or overlooked the concern expressed by many state courts over the disclosure by banks of the intimate details found in their depositors'
accounts.6 6 These state decisions "strikingly [illustrate] the emerging trend among high state courts of relying upon state constitutional protections of individual liberties-protections pervading
counterpart provisions of the United States Constitution, but in7
creasingly being ignored by decisions of this [Supreme] Court."
J. Michael King
65.
66.
67.

See notes 33 and 44 supra.
See notes 43, 48, 51, and 63 supra.
425 U.S. at 446 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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